"This year’s announcement offers a crucial piece of evidence in figuring out which school has been more right about China’s intentions and aspirations. If the school more sanguine about China’s military buildup and strategic ambitions were right, we should have seen a decline in China’s military spending."
"The competition is occurring in two different languages – Russia communicates in military terms, the West in economic – does not mean that there are equally effective. “Guns” can destroy “butter.” A militarily weak Ukraine on a path to political and economic reforms is an invitation for further and most likely larger Russian attacks."
"President Obama’s 2015 National Security Strategy is almost a parody of the worst previous NSS documents. Its catch phrase is “strategic patience,” presumably an attempt to replace “leading from behind.” Much of the document is given over to self-congratulation, touting the administration’s purported achievements. The rest is filler that does not fulfill the document’s promise to provide 'a vision and strategy for advancing the nation’s interests, universal values, and a rules-based international order through strong and sustainable American leadership.'"
"In understanding the travails of Petraeus today, and sizing up what his career has meant to the country, we should think first and foremost about his excellence across many domains of military and strategic endeavor. To my mind, what he did in Iraq was probably the greatest complex accomplishment by any American general since Washington in the Revolutionary War."
"In the end, it was appropriate for the issue to be brought before Congress. There are only two powers capable of preventing Obama sealing a deal with Iran and cementing his legacy as a far-worse foreign policy president than Jimmy Carter."
In the Wall Street Journal, AHS speaker Michael Singh discusses why the Obama administration’s case for nuclear negotiations with Iran includes a set of propositions that, taken together, are contradictory:
"Mr. Netanyahu’s suggestion that final sanctions relief be linked to terrorism and other issues addresses a key but little-acknowledged problem inherent in the narrow U.S. focus on the nuclear issue: how to deter Iranian malfeasance in an environment in which sanctions that have been linked to Iran’s nuclear program as well as to other concerns are being eased."
"The administration has repeatedly signaled that it is willing to accept virtually any deal, including deals that it might have denounced even a few years ago. This is the painful truth that administration insiders will concede in private but rarely state so candidly in public: the best deal President Obama thinks he can get today bears a striking resemblance to how experts would have described a “bad deal” a few years ago."